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ABSTRACT
The robustness of complex networks under targeted attacks is deeply connected to the resilience of complex systems, i.e., the
ability to make appropriate responses to the attacks. In this article, we investigated the state-of-the-art targeted node attack
algorithms and demonstrate that they become very inefficient when the cost of the attack is taken into consideration. In this
paper, we made explicit assumption that the cost of removing a node is proportional to the number of adjacent links that are
removed, i.e., higher degree nodes have higher cost. Finally, for the case when it is possible to attack links, we propose a
simple and efficient edge removal strategy named Hierarchical Power Iterative Normalized cut (HPI-Ncut). The results on real
and artificial networks show that the HPI-Ncut algorithm outperforms all the node removal and link removal attack algorithms
when the cost of the attack is taken into consideration. In addition, we show that on sparse networks, the complexity of this
hierarchical power iteration edge removal algorithm is only O(n log2+ε (n)).
1 Introduction
Resilience of complex networks refers to their ability to react on internal failures or external disturbances (attacks) on nodes or
edges. The reaction is fundamentally connected to the robustness of the network structure1 that represents the complex system,
which is often characterized by the existence of a giant connected component (GCC). Robustness of the connected components
under random failure of nodes or edges is described with classical percolation theory2. In network science, percolation is the
simplest process showing a continuous phase transition, scale invariance, fractal structure and universality and it is described
with just a single parameter, the probability of removing a node or edge. Network science studies have demonstrated that
scale-free networks3, 4 are more robust than random networks5, 6 under random attacks but less robust under targeted attacks7–11.
Recently, studies of network resilience has moved their focus to more realistic scenarios of interdependent networks12, different
failure13 and recovery14, 15 mechanisms.
Although the study of network robustness is mature, the majority of the targeted attack strategies are still based on the
heuristic identification of influential nodes10, 16–19 with no performance guarantees for the optimality of the solution. Finding
the minimal set of nodes such that their removal maximally fragments the network is called network dismantling problem20, 21
and belongs to the NP-hard class. Thus no polynomial-time algorithm has been found for it and only recently different
state-of-the-art methods were proposed as approximation algorithms20–24 for this task. Although state-of-the-art methods20–24
show promising results for network dismantling, we take one step back and analyze the implicit assumption these network
dismantling algorithms have. They make implicit assumption that the cost of removing actions are equivalent for all of the
nodes, regardless of their centrality in network. However, attacking a central node, e.g., a high degree node in socio-technical
systems usually comes with the additional cost when compared to the same action on a low degree node. Therefore, it is more
realistic to explicitly assume that the cost of an attack is proportional to the number of the edges this attack strategy will remove.
We investigated different state-of-the-art algorithms and the results show that with respect to this new concept of cost,
most state-of-the-art algorithms are very inefficient for their high cost, and in most instances perform even worse than random
removal strategy. To overcome this large cost, we proposed a edge-removal strategy, named Hierarchical Power Iterative
Normalized cut (HPI-Ncut) as one of the possible solutions. Actually, removing a node is equivalent to removing all edges of
that node, and therefore all node removal actions can be reproduced with edge removal strategy but vice versa does not hold. To
partition a network, node removal algorithms always remove all the edges connected to some important nodes. However, it is
unnecessary to do this because only some specific edges play a key role both on the importance of the nodes and the connectivity
of the network. In cases when the link removal strategies are possible, our results show that the edge removal algorithm we used
outperforms all the state-of-the-art targeted node attack algorithms. Finally, we compared the cost of the proposed edge removal
strategy HPI-Ncut with other two edge removal strategies which are based on edge betweenness centrality16 and bridgeness
centrality25.
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2 Results
A lot of algorithms have been proposed to address network fragmentation problem8, 10, 19, 22, 26 from the node removal perspective.
These algorithms mainly pay attention to the minimization of the size of the giant connected component and assume that the
cost is proportional to the number of removed nodes. However, the essence of the node removing is to remove all the edges
connected to it. In this article, we make explicit assumption that the cost of removing a node is proportional to the number of
the associated edges that has to be removed. This implies that the nodes with higher degree have higher associated removal cost.
In subsection 2.1, we introduce the empirical and artificial networks that are used in this paper. Then in subsection 2.2,
we quantify the cost of the state-of-the-art node removal strategies and show that in most cases the cost of such attacks are
inefficient. This results have important impact for real world scenarios of network fragmentations where cost budget is limited.
Finally, when it is possible to remove single edges (e.g. shielding a communication links, removing power lines, cutting off
trading relationships or others), we use a spectral edge removal method and compare its cost with other strategies in subsections
2.3, 2.4. The effect of edge removal as an immunization measure for the spreading process is shown in subsection 2.5.
2.1 Data sets
To evaluate the performances of the network dismantling (fragmentation) algorithms, both real networks and synthetic networks
are used in this paper: (i) Political Blogs27 is an undirected social network which was collected around the time of the US.
presidential election in 2004. This network is a relatively dense network whose average degree is 27.36. (ii) Petster-hamster is
an undirected social network which contains friendships and family links between users of the website hamsterster.com. This
network data set can be downloaded from KONECT1. (iii) Powergrid28 is an undirected power grid network in which a node is
either a generator, a transformator or a substation, while a link represents a transmission line. This network data set can also be
downloaded from KONECT2. (iv) Autonomous Systems is an undirected network from the University of Oregon Route Views
Project29. This network data set can be downloaded from SNAP3. (v) Erdo˝s–Re´nyi (ER) network30 is constructed with 2500
nodes. Its average degree is 20 and the replacement probability is 0.01. (vi) Scale-free (SF) network with size 10,000, exponent
2.5, and average degree 4.68. (vii) Scale-free (SF) network with size 10,000, exponent 3.5, and average degree 2.35. (viii)
Stochastic block model (SBM) with ten clusters is an undirected network with 4232 nodes and average degree 2.60. The basic
properties of these networks are listed in table 1.
2.2 Cost-fragmentation inefficiency of the node targeting attack strategies
Let us define the function fD (x) as the size of GCC for fixed attack cost x for strategy D . The cost x ∈ [0,1] is measured as
the ratio of the number of removed edges in the network. Now, for the fixed budget x, the strategy D is more efficient than
strategyL if and only if fD (x)< fL (x), i.e., size of the GCC is smaller by attacking with strategy D than with strategyL
with limited budget x.
One way to compare the attack performances of strategies is to plot the function fD (x) of the size of GCC after attack
versus the cost, see fig. 1. Here we define the cost-fragmentation effectiveness (CFE) for strategy D as the area under the curve
of the size of GCC versus the cost, which can be computed as the integral over all possible budgets: FD =
∫ 1
0 fD (x)dx. The
smaller the CFE (i.e., the area under the curve), the better the attack effect.
Taking into account the role of the cost in targeted attacks, the results are highly counterintuitive: For a fixed budget, many
networks are more fragile with the High Degree (HD) attack strategy than by High Degree Adaptive (HDA) strategy, as the
results shown in table 2 and table 3. Furthermore, the performances of the state-of-the-art node removal-based methods can
become even worse than the naive random removal of nodes (site percolation) when we take into account the attack cost, as
shown in fig. 1 and fig. 2. In addition, comparing with the CFE of site percolation and bond percolation method in table 2, we
can find that the bond percolation works better on the networks with lower average degree, i.e., on the Powergrid, SF (γ = 3.5),
and SBM network, otherwise, it is better to choose the site percolation method.
In fact, networks have their intrinsic resilience under attacking for their distinct network structures. To avoid the in-
terference of the architectural difference of networks, we use site percolation method as a baseline null model. The site
percolation strategy randomly removes nodes in a network, which could be used to reflected the intrinsic resilience of the
attacked network to a certain extent. The cost-fragmentation effectiveness of the site percolation is denoted with F∗=
∫ 1
0 f∗(x)dx.
Table 3 summaries the improvement of CFE of different attack strategiesD comparing with the null model (site percolation),
which is calculated as
∫ 1
0 ( f∗(x)− fD (x))dx. On the whole, all node-centric strategies (HD31, HDA31, EGP19, CI22, CoreHD20
and Min-sum21) distinctly work better than baseline on the three networks with lower average degree, i.e., powergrid, SF
(γ = 3.5), and SBM network. However, on empirical social Petster-hamster network, Political Blogs network, Autonomous
1http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/petster-hamster
2http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/opsahl-powergrid
3https://snap.stanford.edu/data/as.html
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Table 1. Basic statistical features of the GCCs of the eight real and synthetic networks.
Network Nodes Links Avg. Degree Sparsity
Political Blogs 1222 16714 27.36 2.24E-2
Petster-hamster 2000 16098 16.10 8.05E-3
Powergrid 4941 6594 2.67 5.40E-4
Autonomous Systems 6474 12572 3.88 6.00E-4
ER 2500 12500 10.00 4.00E-3
SF (γ = 2.5) 10000 23423 4.68 4.69E-4
SF (γ = 3.5) 10000 11761 2.35 2.35E-4
SBM 4232 5503 2.60 6.15E-4
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Figure 1. The size of the GCC of the networks versus the link removing proportion, comparing with classical node
removal-based methods on real networks. The results of the site percolation are obtained after 100 independent runs.
Systems network and SF (γ = 2.5) network, all node-centric strategies (HD31, HDA31, EGP19, CI22, CoreHD20 and Min-sum21)
are comparably equal or even less cost-fragmentation inefficient than the baseline random model, according to the CFE score.
The last line of the table 3, the average value of the improvement over different networks is computed, which can reflect the
overall CFE of the algorithms. This results suggest that state-of-the-art node-centric algorithms in realistic settings are rather
inefficient if the cost of fragmentation is taken into account.
2.3 The edge-removal problem
In network science, nodes represent entities in a system and edges represent the relationships or interactions between them.
Both the nodes and the edges are the fundamental part of a network. Deleting or removing a specific ratio of them will lead to
great changes in the structure and functions of the network. The problem of network attack or fragmentation has received a
huge amount of attention in the past decade19, 32–35. However, as far as we are concerned, almost all of the attack strategies are
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Figure 2. The size of the GCC of the networks versus link removing proportion, comparing with classical node removal-based
methods on artificial networks. The results of the site percolation are obtained after 100 independent runs.
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Table 2. CFE, i.e., the area under the curve of the size of the GCC after attacking by different algorithms. Psite is short for site
percolation, Pbond for bond percolation, Betw for betweenness, Bridg for bridgeness. The best performing algorithm in each
column is emphasized in bold.
CFE Psite HD HDA EGP CI CoreHD Min-Sum Pbond Betw Bridg HPI-Ncut
Political Blogs 0.638 0.920 0.861 0.619 0.657 0.815 0.726 0.843 0.597 0.910 0.278
Petster-hamster 0.627 0.677 0.696 0.747 0.687 0.736 0.675 0.817 0.536 0.689 0.224
Powergrid 0.371 0.260 0.293 0.263 0.219 0.256 0.130 0.305 0.145 0.420 0.014
Autonomous Systems 0.567 0.576 0.604 0.592 0.567 0.576 0.567 0.605 0.527 0.618 0.192
ER 0.601 0.547 0.647 0.502 0.441 0.647 0.268 0.753 0.387 0.542 0.032
SF (γ = 2.5) 0.619 0.700 0.706 0.671 0.650 0.660 0.636 0.683 0.672 0.694 0.342
SF (γ = 3.5) 0.406 0.231 0.228 0.343 0.214 0.227 0.202 0.298 0.312 0.352 0.092
SBM 0.487 0.419 0.378 0.397 0.348 0.374 0.284 0.384 0.348 0.512 0.075
Table 3. The improvement of the CFE of each algorithm, comparing with the baseline, i.e., site percolation method. The best
performing algorithm in each column is emphasized in bold.
Improvement Pbond HD HDA EGP CI CoreHD Min-Sum Betw Bridg HPI-Ncut
Political Blogs -32% -44% -35% 3% -3% -28% -14% 6% -43% 56%
Petster-hamster -30% -8% -11% -19% -10% -17% -8% 15% -10% 64%
Powergrid 18% 30% 21% 29% 41% 31% 65% 61% -13% 96%
Autonomous Systems -7% -2% -7% -4% 0 -2% 0% 7% -9% 66%
ER -25% 9% -8% 17% 27% -8% 55% 36% 10% 95%
SF (γ = 2.5) -10% -13% -14% -8% -5% -7% -3% -9% -12% 45%
SF (γ = 3.5) 27% 43% 44% 15% 47% 44% 50% 23% 13% 77%
SBM 20% 13% 22% 18% 28% 23% 41% 28% -6% 84%
Average -5% 3% 2% 6% 16% 5% 23% 21% -9% 73%
node removal based, in which the node removal operation is carried out via removing all the edges connected to it. In fact, to
partition a network in to small clusters, it is unnecessary to remove all the links of a node. We remove a node because either
we suppose it has a higher influence or the node is a bridge between clusters. If we remove part of its connected links, its
influence may greatly reduce or it may not be a bridge any more. From another perspective, edges play far different roles in real
networks36, 37. Some of them are crucial to the diffusion process, while others are irrelevant. Thus, if the edge removal actions
on networks are applicable, the edge removal attack will be more accuracy and efficient.
The link fragmentation or attack problem can be narrated as follows: If we have a budget of x links that can be attacked or
removed, which links should we pick? This is mathematically equivalent to asking how to partition a given network with a
minimal separate set of edges. The objective function of link attack takes the following general form38:
cut(A1, · · · ,Ak) := 12
k
∑
i=1
W (Ai,Ai) (1)
where A1, · · · ,Ak are k nonempty subsets from a partition of the original network, Ai is the complement set of the nodes of Ai,
and W (Ai,Ai) is the number of the links between the two disjoint subsets Ai and Ai.
In this paper, we applied the spectral strategy for edge attack problem, which fall in the class of well known spectral
clustering and partitioning algorithms39–43. We use the hierarchical partitioning with Ncut objective function40 combined
with power iteration procedure for approximation of eigenvectors. The complete description of this HPI-Ncut edge removal
strategy will be presented in the Section 3. The results show that the HPI-Ncut strategy greatly decreases the cost of the
attack, comparing with the state-of-the-art nodes removing strategies. In the following subsection, we will compare HPI-Ncut
algorithm with random uniform attack strategy, edge betweenness, bridgeness, and some classical node removing strategies
(see the definitions of these algorithms in the Section 3).
2.4 Effectiveness of the HPI-Ncut algorithm
In general case, each attack strategy algorithm could generate a ranking list of all (or partial) nodes or links of the network.
After removing the nodes or links one after another, the size of the GCC of the residual network characterizes the effectiveness
of each algorithm. The removal process will cease when the size of the GCC is smaller than a given threshold (here we use 0.01).
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Figure 3. The size of the GCC of the networks versus link removing proportion, comparing with existed link removal-based
methods on real networks. The results of the bond percolation are obtained after 100 independent runs.
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Figure 4. The size of the GCC of the networks versus link removing proportion, comparing with existed link removal-based
methods on artificial networks. The results of the bond percolation are obtained after 100 independent runs.
In this paper, to test the effectiveness of this spectral edge removal algorithm, HPI-Ncut, we plot the size of the GCC versus the
removal fraction of links, for both real networks (fig. 1 and fig. 3) and synthetic networks (fig. 2 and fig. 4), comparing with
classical node removing algorithms (fig. 1 and fig. 2) and existed link evaluation methods (fig. 3 and fig. 4). The results show
that the HPI-Ncut algorithm outperforms all the other attack algorithms.
In fig. 1 and fig. 2, we compared the HPI-Ncut algorithm with some state-of-the-art node removal-based target attack
algorithms. Fig. 1 (a) shows that all the node removal-based algorithms are better than the site percolation method on Powergrid
network, that is because the average degree of the Powergrid network is very low, only 2.67. This could also be verified by the
results in fig. 2 (c) and (d), in which the average degree of the SF (γ = 3.5) and the SBM network are 2.35 and 2.60, respectively.
The trends of the curves in fig. 1 and fig. 2 also show that the target attack algorithms works better on networks with lower
average degree. Furthermore, regardless of the HPI-Ncut algorithm, other algorithms have poorer performance than baseline
method (site percolation). The performances of site percolation are better until the proportion of the removed links is greater
than 0.7 on SF (γ = 3.5) network and until the proportion is greater than 0.2 on SF (γ = 2.5) network. The site percolation
on the SF (γ = 3.5) presents an obvious phase transition phenomenon31 comparing with the result on the SF (γ = 2.5). In
addition, in fig. 2 (a) and (d), the SBM network has obvious clusters structure comparing with the ER network. The Min-Sum,
CI, CoreHD, EGP, and site percolation algorithms have a better performance on the SBM network. Moreover, the error of the
site percolation method on the ER network is larger than the error on SBM network. That implies that the cluster structure of a
network has a big influence on the performance of the attack strategies.
To conclude the results of fig. 1 and fig. 2, the state-of-the-art targeted node removal strategies make large cost for optimized
targeted attacks. Contrary, HPI-Ncut algorithm overwhelmingly outperforms all the node removal-based attack algorithms, no
matter on sparse or dense networks, on the networks with or without clusters structure.
In fig. 3 and fig. 4, we compared the HPI-Ncut algorithm with some exited link evaluation algorithms. First of all, we
can find that the HPI-Ncut algorithm works better and is more stable than all the other algorithms. Secondly, comparing with
the results of site and bond percolation in fig. 1 and fig. 2, we can see that the bond percolation method outperforms the site
percolation method only when the average degree of the network is lower (see the results of the Powergrid, SF (γ = 3.5), and
SBM network), otherwise, the site percolation is a better choice. Thirdly, in the fig. 4 (b) and (c), we can see that the bond
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Figure 5. The spreadabilities of the networks before and after the removing of 10% edges by HPI-Ncut algorithm. The x-axis
is the time unites. Pi is the number of infected entities and Pr is the number of recovered entities in the network. In the SIR
model, the infection rate β is 0.10, the recovery rate is 0.02, and the basic reproduction number is 5. All the results are the
average of 100 times independent runs. It is worth noting that the size of GCC of the Powergrid network is only 54 after
removing 10% of links by HPI-Ncut algorithm.
percolation method have a better performance comparing with the edge betweenness and bridegeness algorithm when the cost
is limited on scale-free networks, i.e., the proportion of the removed links is smaller than 0.63 in fig. 4(b) and is smaller than
0.4 in fig. 4(c).
To conclude, the HPI-Ncut algorithm overwhelmingly outperforms all the node removal-based attack algorithms and link
evaluation algorithms, no matter on sparse or dense networks, on networks with or without clusters structure.
2.5 Spreading dynamics after spectral edge immunization/attack
To more intuitively display the targeted attack by HPI-Ncut, we studied the susceptible-infectious-recovery (SIR) 44 epidemic
spreading process on four real networks. We compared both the spreading speed and spreading scope on these networks before
and after targeted immunization by HPI-Ncut. The simulation results in fig. 5 show that, by simply removing 10% of links,
the function of the networks had been profoundly affected by the HPI-Ncut immunization. The proportion of the GCC of the
Political Blogs, Powergrid, Petster-hamster, and Autonomous Systems network after attack are 37% (449/1222), 1% (54/4941),
57% (1146/2000), and 37% (2387/6474), respectively. Thus, the spreading speeds are greatly delayed and the spreading scoops
are tremendously shrunken on these networks.
3 Methods
3.1 Some existed attack strategies
In this subsection, we will briefly introduce some state-of-the-art node removal attack algorithms and some edge evaluation
methods used in this paper. The two edge evaluation methods, i.e., edge betweenness and bridgesness, are used to measure the
importance or significance of links in spread dynamics or structure connectivities of networks. We use them as comparable link
removal-based attack algorithms in this paper.
• Percolation method. In percolation theory45, node of networks usually called ‘site’, while edge usually called ‘bond’. In
the study of the network attack, percolation is a random uniform attack method which either removes nodes randomly
(site percolation) or removes edges randomly (bond percolation).
• Equal graph partitioning (EGP) algorithm. EGP algorithm19, which is based on the nested dissection46 algorithm, can
partition a network into two groups with arbitrary size ratio. In every iteration, EGP algorithm divides the target nodes
set into three subsets: first group, second group, and the separate group. The separate group is made up of all the nodes
that connect to both the first group and the second group. Then minimize the separate group by trying to move nodes to
the first group or the second group. Finally, after removing all the nodes in the separate group, the original network will
be decomposed into two groups. In our implementation, we partition the network into two groups with approximate
equal size.
• Collective Influence (CI) algorithm. CI algorithm22 attacks the network by mapping the integrity of a tree-like random
network into optimal percolation theory47 to identify the minimal separate set. Specifically, the collective influence of a
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node is computed by the degree of the the neighbors belonging to the frontier of a ball with radius l. CI is an adaptive
algorithm which iteratively removes the node with highest CI value after computing the CI values of all the nodes in the
residual network. In our implementation, we compute the CI values with l = 3.
• Min-Sum algorithm. The three-stage Min-Sum algorithm20 includes: (1) Breaking all the circles, which could be detected
form the 2-core17 of a network, by the Min-Sum message passing algorithm, (2) Breaking all the trees larger than a
threshold C1, (3) Greedily reinserting short cycles that no greater than a threshold C2, which ensures that the size of the
GCC is not too large. In our implementation, we set C1 and C2 as 0.5% and 1% of the size of the networks.
• CoreHD algorithm. Inspired by Min-Sum algorithm, CoreHD algorithm21 iteratively deletes the node with highest degree
from the the 2-core17 of the residual network.
• Edge betweenness centrality48. Betweenness is a widely used centrality measure which is the sum of the fraction of
all-pairs shortest paths that pass a node. Edge betweenness, an extension of the betweenness, is used to evaluate the
importance of a link, and is defined as the sum of the fraction of all-pairs shortest paths that pass this link49.
• Bridgeness25. Bridgeness use local information of the network topology to evaluate the significance of edges in
maintaining network connectivity. The bridgeness of a link is determined by the size of k-clique communities that the
two end points of this link are connected with and the size of the k-clique communities that this link is belonging to.
3.2 Hierarchical Power Iterative Normalized cut (HPI-Ncut) edge removal strategy
Here we describe the hierarchical iterative algorithm for edge removal strategy. This algorithm hierarchically applies the
spectral bisection algorithm, which has the same objective function as the Normalized cut algorithm40. Furthermore we have
used the power iteration method to approximate spectral bisection. We provide proof on the exponential convergence and
asymptotic upper bounds for the run-time complexity.
In order to explain our algorithm, we quickly recall the spectral bisection algorithm.
The spectral bisection algorithm
Input: Adjacency matrix W of a network
Output: A separated set of edges that partition the network into two disconnected clusters A, A¯.
1. Compute the eigenvector v2, which corresponds to the second smallest eigenvalue of the normalized Laplacian matrix
Lw = D−
1
2 (D−W )D− 12 , or some other vector v for which vT LwvvT v is close to minimal. We use the power iteration method
to compute this vector, which will be explained later.
2. Put all the nodes with v2(i)> 0 into the first cluster A and all the nodes with v2(i)≤ 0 into the second cluster A¯. All the
edges between these two clusters form the separation set that can partition the network.
The clusters that we obtained by this method had usually very balanced sizes. If, however, it is very important to get clusters
of exactly the same size, one could put those n2 nodes with the largest entries in v2 into one cluster and the remaining nodes into
the other cluster.
Hierarchical Power Iterative Normalized cut (HPI-Ncut) algorithm
Input: Adjacency matrix of a network
Output: Partition of the network into small groups
1. Partition the GCC of the network into two disconnected clusters A and A¯ by using the spectral bisection algorithm and
removing all the links in the separated set.
2. If the budget for link removal has not been overrun, and if the GCC is not yet small enough, partition A and A¯ with step 1,
respectively.
The reason why we cluster hierarchically is that, this allows us to refine the fragmentation gradually. For example, if after
partitioning the network into 2k clusters, we decide that the clusters should be smaller, we would just have to partition each of
the existing clusters into 2 new clusters, obtaining 2k+1 clusters. So the links that were attacked already remain attacked and we
just need to attack some additional ones. If, however, we had used spectral clustering straightforwardly, it could happen that the
set of links to be attacked in order to partition the network into 2k+1 clusters, would not contain the set of links that needed to
be attacked for 2k clusters.
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Power iteration method
Input: Adjacency matrix W of a network
Output: The eigenvector v2 or some other vector v for which v
T Lwv
vT v is close to λ2.
1. Draw v randomly with uniform distribution on the unit sphere.
2. Set v← v− vT1 v · v1, where v1 = 1√n (1, ...,1).
3. For i= 1 to η(n)
v← L˜v‖L˜v‖ , where L˜= 2 · I−Lw and Lw = D−
1
2 (D−W )D− 12 .
Objective function of the spectral bisection algorithm
In appendix A, we show that the spectral bisection algorithm has the same objective function with the relaxed Ncut40 algorithm:
Ncut(A, A¯) := ∑
i∈A, j∈A¯
Wi, j
(
1
∑i∈ADii
+
1
∑ j∈A¯D j j
)
, (2)
where A⊆V denotes set of nodes in the first partition, A¯ the set of nodes in the second partition and Dii is the degree of the
node i.
The main reason we used this objective function is that it minimizes the number of links that are removed and the total sum
of node degree centralities in both partition A and A¯ is approximately equal.
In appendix B, we show the exponential convergence of the power iteration method to the eigenvector associated with the
second smallest eigenvalue of Lw.
Complexity
In appendix C, we show that the complexity of the spectral bisection algorithm is O(η(n) ·n · d¯) and the complexity of the
hierarchical clustering algorithm is O(η(n) ·n · d¯ · log(n)) where η(n) is the number of iterations in the power iteration method.
The power iteration method converges with exponential speed as η(n)→ ∞. The average degree d¯ is almost constant for
large sparse network. Hence we may expect assymptotically good results with η(n) = log(n)1+ε for any ε > 0, giving the
hierarchical spectral clustering algorithm a complexity of O(n · log2+ε(n)). In practice, we have used ε = 0.1, which gives a
complexity of O(n · log2.1(n)).
4 Conclusion
To summarize, we investigated some state-of-the-art node target attack algorithms and found that they are very inefficient when
the cost of the attack is taken into consideration. The cost of removing a node is defined as the number of links that are removed
in the attack process. We found some highly counterintuitive results, that is, the performances of the state-of-the-art node
removal-based methods are even worse than the naive site percolation method with respect to the limited cost. This demonstrates
that the current state-of-the-art node targeted attack strategies underestimate the heterogeneity of the cost associated to node in
complex networks.
Furthermore, in cases when the link removal strategies are possible, we compared the performances of the node-centric
(HD31, HDA31, EGP19, CI22, CoreHD20 and Min-sum21) and edge removal strategies (edge betweenness48 and bridgeness25
strategy) based on the cost of their attacks, which are measured in the same units, i.e., the ratio of the removed links. Node
removal-based algorithms always deletes all the links respected to the removed nodes which is not economical respect to
the limited cost. In order to resolve the high-cost problem in network attack, we proposed a hierarchical power iterative
algorithm (HPI-Ncut) to partition networks into small groups via edge removing, which has the same objective function with the
Ncut40 spectral clustering algorithm. The results show that HPI-Ncut algorithm outperforms all the node removal-based attack
algorithms and link evaluation algorithms on all the networks. In addition, the total complexity of the HPI-Ncut algorithm is
only O(n · log2+ε(n)).
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Appendix A: Objective function
Let G= (V,E) be an undirected graph with adjacency matrixW and diagonal degree matrix D, whose i-th entry Dii =∑nj=1Wi j,
is the degree of the node i. For A⊆V , let cut(A) denote the number of links between A and its complement A¯. We define
Ncut(A, A¯) := cut(A, A¯)
(
1
assoc(A)
+
1
assoc(A¯)
)
. (3)
where assoc(A) = ∑i∈ADii. If we describe the set A by the normalized indicator vector
xA(i) :=
{
1 i f i ∈ A,
−∑ j∈AD j j∑ j∈BD j j otherwise
(4)
one can show40 that
min
A⊆V
Ncut(A, A¯) = min
A⊆V,
xTA (D−W )xA
xTADxA
. (5)
From the definition of Ncut one can see that finding a set A which minimizes Ncut(A, A¯) corresponds to partitioning the network
into two sets A and A¯ such that
1. cut(A, A¯) is small and hence there are only few links between A and A¯
2.
(
1
assoc(A) +
1
assoc(A¯)
)
is small and so the sets A and A¯ contain more or less equally many links.
Finding such a set A is NP-hard 40, but by relaxing the constraints in the RHS of the identity (5) one can find good approximate
solutions A˜:
1. Find
xrelaxed := arg min
x∈Rn,x 6=0
xTD~1=0
xT (D−W )x
xTDx
, (6)
where we have imposed the condition xTD~1 = 0, because every set A for which xA is nontrivial, satisfies xTAD~1 = 0.
2. Set
χA˜(i) = round(xrelaxed(i)) :=
{
1 i f xrelaxed(i)≥ 0,
−1 otherwise (7)
and define A˜= {i ∈ Nodes|χA˜(i) = 1}.
The idea behind this method is that χA˜ will be the best approximation of xrelaxed , out of the set of all vectors with entries in −1
and 1, and since xrelaxed minimizes
xT (D−W )x
xTDx ,
Ncut(A˜) =
xTA˜ (D−W )xA˜
xT
A˜
DxA˜
≈ χ
T
A˜ (D−W )χA˜
χT
A˜
DχA˜
(8)
will be also close to
min
A⊆Nodes
Ncut(A) = min
A⊆Nodes
xTA (D−W )xA
xTADxA
. (9)
One can show that a solution to (6) is given by xrelaxed =D
1
2 v2, where v2 is the eigenvector of the second smallest eigenvalue
λ2 of the normalized Laplacian matrix
Lw = D−
1
2 (D−W )D− 12 . (10)
D is a diagonal matrix and if the network is connected we have Dii > 0. So the entries of the vectors xrelaxed and v2 have the
same sign and therefore we have round(xrelaxed) = round(v2).
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Appendix B: Exponential convergence of the power iteration method
Lw is real and symmetric. Therefore it has real eigenvalues λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λn corresponding to eigenvectors v1, ...,vn
which form an orthonormal basis of Rn. One can easily show that λ1 = 0 and λn ≤ 2. So in order to compute v2 we
consider the matrix L˜= 2 · I−Lw, which has the same eigenvectors v1, ...,vn as Lw. Now the corresponding eigenvalues are
λ˜1 = 2 ≥ ... ≥ λ˜n = dmax− λn ≥ 0 and in particular v1 corresponds to the largest eigenvalue and v2 to the second largest
eigenvalue.
If v is a random vector uniformly drawn from the unit sphere and we force it to be perpendicular to v1 by setting
v← v− vT1 v · v1, then v= ψ2v2+ ...+ψnvn and ψ2 6= 0 almost surely. Furthermore L˜v= λ˜2ψ2v2+ ...+ λ˜nψnvn and if we set
v(k) := L˜kv, then
v(k)
‖v(k)‖ =
λ˜2
kψ2v2+ ...+ λ˜n
kψnvn
‖λ˜2kψ2v2+ ...+ λ˜nkψnvn‖
=
ψ2v2+
(
λ˜3
λ˜2
)k
ψ3v3+ ...+
(
λ˜n
λ˜2
)k
ψnvn
‖ψ2v2+
(
λ˜3
λ˜2
)k
ψ3v3+ ...+
(
λ˜n
λ˜2
)k
ψnvn‖
(11)
converges with exponential speed to some eigenvector of L with eigenvalue λ2, because for every i with λi > λ2 we have λ˜iλ˜2 < 1
and therefore
(
λ˜i
λ˜2
)k
ψivi→ 0. Generally one can deduce from (11) that
v(k)
T
Lwv(k)
v(k)T v(k)
=
λ2|ψ2|2+λ3|
(
λ˜3
λ˜2
)k
ψ3|2+ ...+λn|
(
λ˜n
λ˜2
)k
ψn|2
|ψ2|2+ |
(
λ˜3
λ˜2
)k
ψ3|2+ ...+ |
(
λ˜n
λ˜2
)k
ψn|2
(12)
and therefore this quantity converges to λ2 with exponential speed.
Appendix C: Complexity
The complexity of the spectral bisection algorithm is the same as the complexity of the power iteration method. The complexity
of the power iteration method equals the number of iterations η(n) times the complexity of multiplying L˜ and v. That is
O(η(n) ·n · d¯) where d¯ is the average degree of the network, or equivalently O(|E| ·η(n)) where |E| is the number of edges.
Assuming that the spectral bisection algorithm always produces clusters of equal size, the complexity of the hierarchical
spectral clustering algorithm is then given by the sum of:
• The complexity of applying spectral bisection once on the whole network. → O(η(n) ·n · d¯).
• The complexity of applying it on each of the two clusters that we obtained from the first application of spectral bisection
and which will have size n2 .
• The complexity of applying it on each of the 4 clusters that we obtained from the previous step and which will have size
n
4 .
• The complexity of applying it on each of the n2 = 2log2(n)−1 clusters that we obtained from the previous step and which
will have size n
2log2(n)−1
= 2.
That is in total at most
O(η(n) ·n · d¯)+2 ·O(η(n) · n
2
· d¯)+ ...+2log2(n)−1 ·O(η(n) · n
2log2(n)−1
· d¯)
=
log2(n)−1
∑
i=0
2i ·O(η(n) · n
2i
· d¯)
= O(η(n) ·n · d¯)
log2(n)−1
∑
i=0
1
= O(η(n) ·n · d¯ · log2(n)),
(13)
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where we have made the pessimistic assumption that the number of iterations and the average degrees are in each step as large
as they were in the beginning.
The choice of the function η(n) is a little bit involved. If the initial random choice of the vector v is very unfortunate,
there may be many iterations needed in order to have a good approximation of the eigenvector v2. In fact, if ψ2 = 0, then this
algorithm would not converge to v2 at all, however this event has probability 0.
Another condition that might slow down the computation of v2 is if some of the other eigenvalues λi, i≥ 3 are close to λ2.
In that case λ˜i
λ˜2
would be close to 1 and therefore one can see from equation (11) that the correspoding vi might have a large
contribution in v(k) for a long time. However when λi is close to λ2, this also implies that
vTi Lwvi
vTi vi
= λi (14)
is close to
min
‖v‖6=0
vTLwv
vT v
= λ2 (15)
and therefore also provides a good partition of the network, since these are the quantities that are related to the cut-size.
Due to this fast convergence, one can expect assymptotically good partitions when η(n) = log(n)1+ε and ε > 0, giving
the hierarchical spectral clustering algorithm a complexity of O(n · d¯ · log2+ε(n)) in general and O(n · log2+ε(n)) for sparse
networks.
Appendix D: HPI-Ncut algorithm with different number of partitions
Previous sections give us an clear picture about the performances of different attack algorithms. Some algorithms work quite
well, such as HPI-Ncut algorithm, Min-Sum algorithm, and edge betweenness algorithm, while others are not. What causes
such a difference? Fig. 6 may give us a clue. In this toy example, the original network is a two clusters SBM model with totally
2078 nodes and 3729 links. Fig. 6 shows the visualization of the top 10% removed links of different algorithms. Please note
that, the number of the red links in fig. 6(b-f) are the same, namely, 373. However, comparing with edge betweenness and
HPI-Ncut algorithm, much less of links between the two clusters are removed by EGP and CI algorithm, and more links are
distributed among the left or the right cluster. Further more, comparing with edge betweenness algorithm, the links removed by
HPI-Ncut algorithm mainly are distributed in the bridge part of the two clusters. This helps to partition the network into two
disconnected clusters.
In the previous sections, the default target number of the disconnected clusters in HPI-Ncut algorithm is set to 2. Fig. 7
shows the size of the GCC after targeted attack by HPI-Ncut with different target number of disconnected clusters, on the SBM
network with two clusters and with ten clusters, respectively. Fig. 7 indicates that when the original networks contains less
clusters, the target number of clusters in HPI-Ncut will greatly affect the size of GCC in the initial stage of the target attack,
while, this influence will decline sharply in the later part of the attack process. However, the target number has a smaller impact
on the attack performances of the HPI-Nuct when the original network contains much more clusters. Further more, when the
target number of the disconnected clusters is set to 2, we can always obtain the optimal outcome on both networks. To conclude,
we recommend to set the default target number of the disconnected clusters to 2 in HPI-Ncut algorithm.
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(a) Original network (b) HDA
(d) CI(c) EGP
(e) Betweenness (f) HPI-Ncut
Figure 6. The schematic diagram of the removed links in a SBM network with two clusters. (a) is the original network with
all the links. (b)-(f) are the top 10% links (i.e., 373 links) removed by different algorithms.
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(b) SBM with ten clusters
Figure 7. The size of the GCC of the networks versus link removing proportion, comparing of different quantities of target
disconnected clusters in HPI-Ncut algorithm.
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